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
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
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
CONTENTS

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3. Vietnam: Hanoi sends note to Britain and USSR appealing for measures to halt US aggression in South Vietnam. (*Page ii*)

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9. Britain-Rhodesia: Britain facing growing African pressures for dissolution of Rhodesian Federation. (*Page vi*)

10. Dominican Republic: Council of State authorizes deportation of pro-Castro and leftist elements. (*Page vi*)


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12. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin Situation. (*Page viii*)

13. Watch Committee Conclusions. (*Page x*)

25X1



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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 February 1962

DAILY BRIEF

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i

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
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
Vietnam: North Vietnam's Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem has sent a note to the cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference--the USSR and Britain--calling for "urgent measures to halt US armed aggression in South Vietnam." This note, sent on 20 February, followed by two days a North Vietnamese Government

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22 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

ii



25X1

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Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200280001-2

declaration charging that the newly established US military command in South Vietnam threatened North Vietnam's security, a charge which is repeated in Khiem's letter to the co-chairmen.

Other appeals from Hanoi on this issue have received little more than perfunctory treatment by the USSR but, within the past few days, Moscow has shown a more vigorous propaganda support for North Vietnam's position. One Soviet broadcast, in reaction to Defense Secretary McNamara's recent talks in Honolulu, cited Western press reports which draw an analogy between the South Vietnamese crisis and the Korean war and asked, "Can peace-loving countries remain inactive?" [REDACTED]

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On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board on 21 February, reached the following conclusion concerning South Vietnam:

The pattern of Viet Cong military activity remains unchanged. The Viet Cong also appear to be meeting with some success in their political and propaganda activities aimed at extending their control in the countryside and gaining support in urban areas.

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22 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF


iii


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***Britain-Rhodesia:** Britain is facing growing African pressures for dissolution of the largely self-governing Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. To Africans, federation symbolizes white domination, and Nyasaland leader Hastings Banda recently stated he would not even support economic association. The Macmillan government is apparently willing to eliminate the federal powers, but believes that economic progress depends upon maintaining a close association among the three territories. On the other hand federal Prime Minister Welensky, who has in the past shown he has powerful friends in London, insists that the Federation should be maintained in its present form, Commonwealth Relations Secretary Sandys returned to London on 21 February from an apparently fruitless two-week effort to bridge the gap between the Africans and the Europeans. 

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
***Dominican Republic:** The Council of State has authorized the deportation of pro-Castro and other extreme leftist leaders under a state of emergency proclaimed on 21 February. Some members of the council earlier had resisted the deportation of

22 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

vi

25X1



25X1

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pro-Communist Maximo Lopez Molina, the leader of the Dominican Popular Movement, and other leftists because they feared public opinion would associate the action with political repression as practiced by the Trujillos. [REDACTED]

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22 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

vii

25X1

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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The United States Intelligence Board has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 7 through 20 February 1962:

1. On the basis of a review of Soviet actions affecting the Berlin air corridors we conclude that Moscow is pursuing the following broad political aims:
 - a. To demonstrate both the vulnerability of Western access and Soviet determination to end all remaining four-power aspects of access controls;
 - b. To increase tensions and generate pressure for the West to be agreeable to negotiations on broader issues and to loosen up the Western bargaining position on Berlin;
 - c. To undermine the morale in West Berlin by menacing the only route of civilian access not under East German control.

More specifically, we believe that the Soviets hope to achieve some of the following short-term objectives:

- a. To establish a claim that free access is based on the sufferance of the USSR and, by implication, of East Germany;
- b. To implement procedures for controlling air access which would imply recognition of the East - West German border as an international frontier;
- c. To undermine the basis of existing four-power procedures for processing traffic in the corridors;

22 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

viii

- d. To reduce the Soviet role in the Berlin Air Safety Center to that of an observer or even withdrawing, or to gain East German participation;
- e. To disrupt civilian flight schedules by warning that the lack of Soviet guarantees will produce dangerous consequences.

2. We do not believe that the USSR at this time intends to deny Western access or engage in such a level of harassment that a military confrontation would be likely. However, Soviet willingness to challenge the Western powers in such an area of vital interest as air access reflects an increased readiness to step up the level of general harassments and probes of Western reaction. This intention is also reflected in the restriction of interzonal train traffic to a single-track line just before entering into West Berlin, the increased aggressiveness of the East German police along the sector boundary in Berlin, and the more rigid stand taken by Gromyko in the Moscow talks.

3. The committee has reviewed available intelligence on the broad range of possible Soviet moves pertaining to Berlin, but currently available evidence does not support a firm prediction of which new moves the USSR is most likely to make. The general improvement over the past few months in Communist capabilities for physical interference with access to Berlin provides a stronger position for action than was the case during the tense period last July and August. We anticipate that the Communists will take advantage of this situation to apply intermittent pressure on the Western position and on West German access, varying the object and form of pressure in the light of Western reactions.

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22 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

ix

25X1

WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

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SOUTH VIETNAM: (Carried on Page iii of Daily Brief.)

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22 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

x

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Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

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The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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